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The Consolidation of the Secondary Financial
Services Market
DAVID STOESZ
University of Illinois–Springfield
Department of Social Work
Stagnant income and persistent debt have induced low- and
middle-income households to rely on alternative financial services (AFS): buy-here-pay-here auto loans, check-cashers, payday
loans, auto title loans, rent-to-own furniture and appliances, and
pawnshops. A secondary financial services market has evolved to
serve the secondary labor market, replete with trade associations
as well as state and federal regulators. Mainstream financial institutions have marketed innovations, such as reloadable debit
cards, to appeal to low- and middle-income consumers. High fees
and interest rates of AFS products have fueled a volatile debate
about the future of the secondary financial services market,
with options including prohibition, regulation, and inclusion.
Key words: debt, alternative financial services, AFS, secondary
financial services, secondary labor market

A tidal wave of debt has swept over the lower economic
elevations of America, not only obliterating the prosperity of
poor households that had struggled with declining incomes
for decades, but more recently destabilizing a large swath of
middle-income families that relied on credit to bolster family
finances (Edsall, 2012). The Great Recession, a dramatic reversal of the fortunes of low- and middle-income families,
caused working class families to resort to Alternative Financial
Services (AFS) to maximize their increasingly tenuous resources; however, as the tsunami reached higher elevations, middleincome households turned to AFS, as well. When banks and
credit unions failed to respond to the needs of increasingly
desperate working families, struggling households resorted to
a burgeoning network of buy-here-pay-here auto sales, payday
and auto title lenders, check-cashers, rent-to-own vendors, and
pawnshops.
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Theory
That such vendors would evolve during a prolonged economic crisis is consistent with Robert Merton’s (1957) observation that those of lower status create institutional arrangements
when mainstream opportunity structures are not available.
Practically speaking, AFS evolved to serve financially bereft
households. In theoretical terms, a secondary financial services
market, providing quick cash at relatively high fees and interest, had evolved parallel to a secondary labor market, consisting of low-wage, intermittent jobs without benefits or career
trajectories.
The theoretical basis of AFS is largely derived from neoclassical economics, which presumes that people use information at hand in order to make rational choices about their
well-being. Various factors interfere with this formulation,
explaining the advent of AFS: people lack adequate information about products and make suboptimal decisions; vendors
are not equally distributed geographically and they customize
products to meet consumer preferences; and, consumers are
creatures of habit, frequenting vendors when better choices
are readily available (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Within a larger
social context, these imperfections contribute to economic
inequality, which is exacerbated by institutional dynamics:
public schools fail to educate, employers discriminate against
job applicants, and social programs provide inadequate benefits and services (Stiglitz, 2012). The interaction of these dynamics leaves certain rural and urban areas in chronic poverty
(Jargowsky, 1997), and residents frequently resort to AFS.
Initially justified in order to reverse the ravages of the
Great Depression, government has been actively involved
in public policy, in the process affecting economic inequality
(Noah, 2012). Since the 1980s, policies preferred by conservative Republicans have subverted the prosperity of low- and
middle-income Americans, battening those with high incomes
(Johnson & Kwak, 2012). Thus, dualism, a persistent feature
of democratic-capitalist political economies, has become more
pronounced. While the primary labor market has benefited
from job security and financial products, the secondary labor
market has experienced significant erosion in its economic
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circumstances. This is evident not only with respect to income,
but assets as well (Lerman & McKernan, 2008). Without adequate income to sustain an already precarious level of consumption, many working class families sought credit wherever
it was available, finding AFS vendors receptive to their needs.
The cost of AFS products was high, but the plight of many lowincome people was urgent, and they had few options.
As the secondary financial services market expanded and
diversified, it became embedded in lower-income urban and
rural communities. Eventually, AFS vendors became a fixture
in the lives of the working poor. At the same time, the high
fees and interest rates of some products (such as payday loans,
which carry an APR of 391 percent for $15 charged per $100
over two weeks) have provoked a volatile debate about reform
of AFS. Innovation in the secondary financial services market
evolved as technological developments, such as payroll direct
deposit and reloadable debit cards, are marketed to consumers
who find them more attractive than traditional financial products of mainstream financial institutions.
A burgeoning secondary financial services market would
mature with the establishment of trade associations representing the interests of vendors. At the same time, fierce opposition would arise from nonprofit organizations that vehemently objected to the high APR of AFS products. The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), established in 2010, was
designed to rein-in financial abuses from Wall Street to Main
Street; however, its rocky start reflected the turbulence of the
financial services markets. Ultimately, the future of the secondary financial services market will be determined by three
quite disparate strategies of reform: prohibition, regulation, or
inclusion.

Background
The working poor have long relied on financial services
that have been separate from mainstream banking. As such,
various financial products have evolved which have prompted state and federal regulation; regardless, low-income, minority families have found mainstream financial institutions
chronically problematic with respect to their financial needs.
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For example, the proliferation of salary lenders after the
Civil War served as an impetus for state usury prohibitions,
contributing to Progressive Era reforms and, ultimately, the
regulatory regime of the New Deal (Longman & Boshara,
2009). Denied access to mainstream financial institutions, immigrants and freed slaves established their own savings institutions. Early in the 20th century, the credit abuse of poor immigrants prompted the Russell Sage Foundation to subsidize
philanthropic pawnshops (known as remedial loan societies)
in several large cities, of which only the Provident Loan Society
still exists in New York City at five locations (Caskey, 1994).
In 1933 the Glass-Steagall Act authorized the newly established Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
to regulate savings institutions and limit interest rates for
savings accounts as well. Decades later, the 1977 Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) prohibited “red-lining,” the practice of denying mortgages and other loans to entire neighborhoods of consumers suspected of being high risk, and required
banks to make credit available to poor families. Just as the CRA
prompted banks to serve low-income, disproportionately minority families, stagflation of the mid-1970s pushed interest
rates above traditional usury limits, prompting states to relax
regulation of financial institutions. Soon, bi-partisan support
grew for deregulating financial services altogether, liberal
Democrats advocating for innovative financial products to
bring the marginalized poor into the economic mainstream,
and conservative Republicans seizing the opportunity to shed
the burdensome regulations that had interfered with selfcorrecting financial markets. The resultant 1980 Depository
Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act removed
interest rate caps on loans, providing a fertile ground for expansion of vendors outside the financial mainstream (Bostic &
Lee, 2009).
As nonmainstream financial providers expanded after the
1980s, introducing new product lines, their lexicon evolved
accordingly. Initial reactions were negative, as the invocation
of “predatory lender” by Bruce Marks when he challenged
Boston’s Fleet Bank for appending high fees and interest rates
on loans to duped consumers in the early 1990s, attests (Rivlin,
2010). An early study described the activities of check-cashers
and pawn lenders as “fringe banking,” a British term coined
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by economist Hyman Minsky (Caskey, 1994). Eventually,
scholars proposed the term “alternative financial services” to
differentiate pawnshops, payday lenders, check cashers, and
rent-to-own stores from traditional financial institutions. A
journalistic exposé freighted the fringe economy with terms
such as “shadow banks,” “financial shakedowns,” and “shark
bait” (Hudson, 1996), while an academic critique that included
payday lenders, buy-here-pay-here auto sales, and subprime
mortgages referred to lenders as the “fringe economy or predatory lending” (Karger, 2005). In 2009, the FDIC published its
first assessments of Alternative Financial Services (AFS), and
the term has since become widely accepted.

Declining Fortunes
What had been a relatively small fringe economy expanded exponentially during the final decades of the 20th century.
A primary factor was the decline in discretionary income of
working class families. “The average two-income family earns
far more today than did the single breadwinner of a generation
ago,” observed then-Harvard professor Elizabeth Warren and
her financial consultant daughter. “And yet, once they have
paid the mortgage, the car payments, the taxes, the health insurance, and the day-care bills, today’s dual-income families
have less discretionary income—and less money to put away
for a rainy day—than the single-income family of a generation
ago” (Warren & Tyagi, 2003, p. 3).
The expansion of AFS paralleled the steady erosion of the
income of the working poor. Between 1979 and 2011, the growth
in household income of the bottom quintile of families was negative 0.4 percent and zero for the next lowest quintile. Falling
family income followed the decline of good jobs—those paying
the median wage of $18.50 in 1979 (in 2011 dollars) coupled
with employer-provided health insurance and a company
pension—from 37.4 percent in 1979 to 27.7 percent in 2011, a
drop of 25.9 percent. Meanwhile, from 1979 to 2011 wages fell
4.3 percent for the lowest decile of workers and increased only
1.3 percent for the second decile. The proportion of workers
earning poverty-level wages remained virtually unchanged
despite the economic expansion of the 1990s, 29.9 percent in
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1973 dropping to 28.0 percent in 2011. The underemployment
rate, historically higher for African Americans and Hispanics,
compared to Whites, doubled from 2008 to 2010, reaching 25
percent. By 2010, the number of unemployed, those working
part-time but wanting full-time work, and workers marginally attached to the labor force exceeded 25 million (Economic
Policy Institute, 2012). Not only did the lowest forty percent
of families absorb significant income losses during the Great
Recession, but they also continued to lose income after the recovery began.
Under optimal circumstances, households can rely on
assets to buffer income shocks; however, few low-income
families have sufficient reserves to sustain themselves for
three months at the federal poverty level. Before the Great
Recession, such “asset poverty” was extensive: between 1996
and 2001, the average family in the lowest quartile of households claimed assets valued at $0 and for the bottom half only
$31. Fully 84.5 percent of families in the bottom third of the
income distribution claimed such small reserves as to be asset
poor (McKernan, Ratcliffe & Vinopal, 2009). During the 2000s,
many low-income families went into debt, some spectacularly
so. In 2001, the mean net worth of households at or below the
25th percentile was $100, but by 2010, it was negative $12,800.
During this period, the mean net worth of households between
the 25th and 49.9th percentile dropped from $54,400 to $35,600
(Federal Reserve, 2012). Predictably, the financial prospects of
lower income families worsened during the Great Recession.
In 2009, the average wealth of the lowest quintile of families
was negative $27,000, while that of the second lowest quintile
was only $5,000. Between 1983 and 2010 the net worth of the
lowest 40 percent of households declined 1.95 percent, leaving
them with few resources to address routine bills, let alone
expense shocks (Economic Policy Institute, 2012).
The Great Recession effectively erased the asset gains of
minority households. Between 2005 and 2009, median wealth
of White households fell 16 percent, but 53 percent for AfricanAmerican families and 66 percent for Hispanics. Minority families not only lost financial ground, but many found themselves
in debt: almost one-third of Black households (35 percent) and
Hispanic households (31 percent) had zero or negative net
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worth in 2009, compared with 15 percent of White households,
a significant increase since 2005, when 29 percent of Blacks,
23 percent of Hispanics, and 11 percent of White households
reported zero or negative wealth. Put another way, in 2009 24
percent of African-American households and 24 percent of
Hispanic households had no assets other than a vehicle (Taylor,
Kochar, Fry, Valasco, & Motel, 2011, pp. 1, 23).
Table 1. Share of Debtors with Any Payment 60 Days or More Past
Due, Percentile
Family Income

2001

2010

Less than 20

13.4

21.2

20 to 39.9

11.7

15.2

40 to 59.9

7.9

10.2

60 to 79.9

4.0

8.8

80 to 89.9

2.6

5.4

90 to 100

1.3

2.1

Less than 25

17.8

22.2

25 to 49.9

7.1

13.3

50 to 74.9

3.6

6.8

75 to 89.9

.7

2.0

90 to 100

.3

1.2

Family Net Worth

Source: Federal Reserve Board, Survey of Consumer Finances, 2012.

From 2001 to 2010, faltering income and eroding assets in
relation to household expenses left consumers in debt, struggling to pay bills on time. While more than one in ten low-income and low-wealth households had missed a debt payment
beyond two months in 2001, the percent had increased significantly by 2010. More and more families were falling further
behind in debt (Federal Reserve, 2012).
The Great Recession also retarded upward mobility among
minority families, which had lagged previously. A pre-recession report on mobility sponsored by prominent policy institutes across the ideological spectrum concluded,
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It is fairly hard for children born in the bottom fifth to
escape from the bottom: 42 percent remain there and
another 42 percent end up in either the low-middle or
middle fifth. Only 17 percent of those born to parents in
the bottom quintile climb to one of the top two income
groups. (Isaacs, 2006a, p. 5)
Many minority children actually experienced downward
mobility. Of Black children with middle class parents, 45
percent fell to the bottom of the income distribution, compared
to 16 percent of White children. Poor Black children fared the
worst: 54 percent of children in families in the bottom quintile remained there, compared to 31 percent of White children
(Isaacs, 2006b). The recession further slowed the upward mobility of minorities. A post-recession analysis of economic mobility concluded that one-fourth of middle class children had
fallen out of the middle class as adults, a prospect that affected
38 percent of African-American men (Acs, 2011).

Banking Defections
While the economic travails of the working poor became
more acute, mainstream financial institutions were less accessible to them. Between 1975 and 1995 the number of banks and
savings institutions serving communities with upper incomes
increased from 9,251 to 15,646, while those serving neighborhoods with lower incomes decreased from 2,164 to 1,719
(Avery, Bostic, Calem, & Canner, 1997). Karger (2005) observed:
The consolidation in the banking industry over the
past 20 years has reduced the number of banks in
low-income neighborhoods, increased the focus of
banks on corporate and high-income customers, and
limited banks’ interest in serving consumers with small
accounts or less-than-perfect credit. (p. 12).
Bank deregulation, in other words, left large numbers of
poor Americans without convenient banking institutions for
essential financial services, a vacuum that AFS would quickly
fill. “Check-cashing stores and pawnshops and payday lending
stores, those are the poor man’s institutions,” proclaimed
former pro-football player and ad man for Advance America,
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Willie Green:
You go to any poor Black person, and I guarantee you,
they’ve borrowed money from a payday person, a
title loan person, or a pawnshop. That’s what you do
if you don’t have the luxury of going into a bank and
borrowing money. (quoted in Rivlin, 2010, p. 256)
As banks and savings associations retreated from low-income areas, a significant number of consumers became “unbanked” because they did not have an account with a bank
or credit union or “underbanked” because they had such an
account, but used AFS as well. In part, not having a formal relationship with mainstream financial institutions was due to bad
experiences. During a five-year period, 73 percent of payday
consumers had loan applications refused or limited by mainstream financial organizations. Subsequently, 67.7 percent did
not apply for loans from banks or credit unions because they
expected the application to be rejected (Elliehausen, 2006). By
the late 2000s, the number of unbanked consumers lacking a
savings or checking account totaled 7.7 million households
or 9 million Americans; underbanked consumers who had a
savings or checking account but relied on AFS represented
17.9 percent of households, or 21 million Americans. Access
to financial services fell disproportionately on racial and minority groups. While 21.7 percent of African Americans and
19.3 percent of Latinos were unbanked, those underbanked
were 31.6 percent and 24.0 percent respectively, rates significantly higher than the general population. The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) concluded, “overall, almost 54
percent of black households, 44.5 percent of American Indian/
Alaskan households, and 43.3 percent of Hispanic households
are either unbanked or underbanked” (2009, pp. 3-4). Even
if they held accounts with mainstream financial institutions,
many lower income families relied on AFS as well, especially
minority households.
The defection of consumers from mainstream financial institutions is evident in data collected by the Survey of
Consumer Finances. In 1989, 18.7 percent of respondents had a
checking account. By 2010, the percentage had dropped to 9.6
percent. Over a decade, consumers voiced different reasons for
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not having checking accounts, as seen in the following tables.
Conspicuous changes include the percent of consumers who
do not write enough checks to make a checking account worthwhile and the increase in those who do not like banks, over
one-fourth of respondents (Federal Reserve, 2012).
Table 2. Reasons for Not Having a Checking Account, Percent
Reason

2001

2010

Do not write enough checks to make it
worthwhile

28.5

20.3

Minimum balance too high

6.5

7.4

Do not like dealing with banks

22.6

27.8

Service charges too high

10.2

10.6

Cannot manage or balance a checking account

6.6

4.7

Do not have enough money

14.0

10.3

Credit problems

3.6

4.2

Do not need/want an account

5.1

7.3

Other

2.8

7.4

Source: Federal Reserve Board, Survey of Consumer Finances, 2012.

Table 3. Select Populations by Banking Status
% Unbanked

% Underbanked

% Fully
Banked

All Households

8.2

20.1

68.8

Blacks

21.4

33.9

41.6

Hispanics

20.1

28.6

48.7

Foreign-born
noncitizens

22.2

28.9

45.8

Unemployed

22.5

28.0

47.5

Income below $15,000

28.2

21.6

47.6

Unmarried

19.1

29.5

48.8

Under age 24

17.4

31.0

49.7

Population

Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2012.

By 2012, many consumers had begun to use AFS. While
a majority of the population had a financial relationship with
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a bank or credit union, many demographic groups either
engaged with AFS or lacked any relationship with mainstream
financial institutions.

The Rise of Alternative Financial Services
Declining fortunes with respect to income and assets
eroded the already fragile finances of working poor families. A
survey of the unemployed showed that many resorted to borrowing to meet routine expenses but all too often found that
inadequate; as a result debt accumulated. Researchers from
Rutgers University found that 56 percent of the unemployed
borrowed money from family and friends to cover expenses
in 2010; 45 percent increased credit card debt, but 25 percent
missed credit card payments. While 24 percent missed a mortgage or rent payment, 8 percent declared bankruptcy (BorieHoltz, Van Horn, & Zukin, 2010, p. 12).
Mounting stress on family finances increased the demand
for credit in low- and moderate-income households. As their
economic prospects dwindled and households struggled
to pay routine bills and faced unexpected expense shocks, a
growing number of families needed quick access to short-term
credit to keep their foundering economic boats afloat. In 2010,
the FINRA Investor Education Foundation published the first
of three studies of financial capability which included several
AFS products: auto title loans, payday loans, an advance on
a tax refund, pawn, and rent-to-own. “Non-bank methods of
borrowing” were higher among the minority poor who were
younger and less-educated. While Blacks and Latinos were
equally likely to take out an auto title loan, African Americans
were more likely to frequent a pawnshop while Latinos were
more likely to resort to payday lending. Almost one-fourth of
respondents, 23 percent, had used one of these AFS products
within the past five years, and utilization was higher for the
unbanked, 44 percent, than those who had bank accounts, 20
percent (FINRA Foundation, 2010, pp. 6-7).
Similarly, a survey of Latino households in Los Angeles
conducted by the Pew Health Group revealed that many
households resorted to AFS: 37 percent of those with a bank
account and 74 percent of the unbanked. Families found AFS
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providers accessible geographically and during evening and
weekend hours. Many found AFS a convenient way to pay
monthly bills. Researchers concluded that Hispanic households represented a sizeable financial market that was served
by AFS providers (Tellalian, Tseng, & Eleni, 2010).
In 2010, the Center for Financial Services Innovation (CSFI)
surveyed 170 providers of financial products (32 percent nonprofits, 17 percent banks, 12 percent credit unions, 11 percent
vendors, 8 percent prepaid card vendors, and 7 percent check
cashers/payday lenders) and reported that 87 percent of those
serving the underbanked expected services to expand, including 94 percent of commercial providers. The portrait that
emerged from the CFSI survey was one in which varied organizations—for-profit and nonprofit, mainstream and AFS—met
a growing need for immediate, short-term loans. “Although
the danger of using credit products to excess is undeniable,
consumers need access to appropriate forms and amounts of
credit in order to smooth income and pay for emergencies,”
observed CFSI analysts. “In fact, well-structured credit is essential to support a household’s ability to save and build a
robust credit history, and to facilitate crucial investments that
can provide a foundation for other wealth-building activities”
(Center for Financial Services Innovation, 2011).
A subsequent CFSI analysis of small-dollar credit borrowers suggested four primary reasons for resorting to AFS: (1)
confrontation with expense shocks, leaving 47 percent of borrowers to take out one or two loans per year; (2) erratic cash
flow, accounting for borrowing smaller amounts, with 42
percent taking out six or more loans annually, while 16 percent
take out more than 12 loans annually; (3) insufficient income,
prompting borrowers to take out loans to meet routine expenses, accounting for smaller loans, with 77 percent of loans less
than $500; and (4) planned purchases for a car or appliance,
accounting for one or two loans per year, but at amounts that
exceeded $1,000 (Bianchi & Levy, 2013). CFSI research of borrowers' perceptions are supported by researchers from the Pew
Charitable Trusts, who reported that 56 percent of consumers
found payday loans a source of relief, as opposed to 31 percent
who said payday loans were a source of anxiety. Yet, urgency
plays a role in borrowing: 37 percent of respondents stated
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they would have sought a payday loan under any conditions
offered (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013, pp. 21, 41). As consumer demand for credit expanded, working families resorted to
various strategies to address static income and deteriorating
assets, sometimes under acute financial distress.
By the end of the 2000s, AFS represented a significant
market in financial services, generating over $319 billion annually by providing financial services to those who are excluded
from, or elected to avoid, mainstream financial services.
Table 4. Primary Sectors of the Secondary Financial Services Market
Sector

Volume
($Billions)

Percent

Buy-Here-Pay-Here Auto Loans

80

Check Cashing

58

18.1

Payday Loans

48

15.0

Overseas Wire Remittances

46

14.3

Open-Loop Prepaid Cards

39

12.1

Refund Anticipation Loans

26

8.1

Money Orders

17

5.3

7

2.2

Rent-to-Own Transactions

24.9

Source: (Bradley, Burhouse, Gratton & Miller, 2009, p. 39)

Such growth was evidence that AFS was responding to
consumer demand by hiring courteous staff that arranged
quick transactions through hours extended into the evenings
and weekends (Servon, 2013). The proliferation of payday
lending, by way of illustration, has been attributed to its
appeal to consumers who have had negative experiences
with banks. Scanning the interior of a payday loan store, a
journalist observed, “It’s like banking turned upside down.
Poor customers are commodities, deposits are irrelevant, bad
credit makes for a good loan candidate and recessions can be
boom times” (McGray, 2008). In a presentation to the FDIC,
the Financial Service Centers of America (FiSCA) described
how its members responded to customers by including access
to services at times and locations that are convenient to them,
and that suit non-traditional work schedules that leave little
free time.
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They need the services to be provided in languages
they can understand—frequently more than just
English and Spanish—by staff that makes them feel
comfortable and that reflects the culture, customs and
colors of the neighborhood. They need products and
services tailored to their unique needs, preferences
and economic circumstances, rather than being served
“stripped-down” versions of what is designed for more
affluent consumers. (FiSCA, 2007, p. 2)
In this regard, FiSCA reported in 2006 that 75 percent of
consumers rated the value of its financial products as “excellent” or “very good,” virtually the same level of customer
satisfaction in 2000. Similarly, 78 percent of consumers rated
service quality as “excellent” or “very good,” a slight decrease
from 81 percent in 2000 (Cirillo, 2006). Studies such as this are
conducted on a sample of customers who use financial services at stores that subscribe to FiSCA’s “codes of conduct” that
prescribe best practices for member vendors (FiSCA, 2013), a
condition of membership, so consumer perceptions may be
different at non-FiSCA member stores.
The establishment of trade associations reflected the
maturation of AFS. The Financial Service Centers of America
(FiSCA) was established in 1987 and represents vendors of
several products: check cashing, money transfers, bill paying,
money orders, and payday loans. Initially representing checkcashers, FiSCA has expanded to other lines of financial services and now represents 7,000 providers serving 30 million
consumers annually. Joseph Doyle, FiSCA’s Chairman, noted
the reason why the organization has grown:
Our customers appreciate the convenient access and
high quality services we offer. We fit into their busy
lives, with most FiSCA member stores open six or
seven days a week. Almost all of our members are open
hours later than banks and credit unions; some even
stay open 24 hours a day. Consumers are very willing
to pay reasonable fees for this type of convenience and
recognize that we offer good value. In many cases it is
less expensive to use one of our outlets than to use a
bank. In fact, 60 percent of FiSCA member customers
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have a traditional savings or checking account at a bank
or credit union, yet choose to conduct their financial
transactions at our member locations (Doyle, 2013, p.
1).
In 1999 the Community Financial Services Association
of America (CFSA) was established as a membership organization of payday lenders. In April 2001, CFSA collaborated with the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown
University in a survey of payday customers, which revealed
that most were workers supporting young families and who
possessed a checking account (Elliehausen & Lawrence, 2001).
Subsequently, one of the researchers of this study moved to
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and authored a January 2009 report on payday lending, which showed
that most borrowers used loans for emergencies and were
quite satisfied with the product (Elliehausen, 2009). CFSA promoted “best practices” among members, including the offer to
customers of an “extended payment plan” through which borrowers are offered more time to pay off a loan (CFSA, 2009).

Conclusion
This installment, the first of a two-part series, chronicles
the evolution of AFS in response to the deteriorating financial
circumstances of working poor households. Already tenuous,
as measured by income and assets, the prosperity of low-income families plummeted during the Great Recession, with
the impact especially damaging for minority households. In
order to sustain an increasingly precarious standard of living,
families resorted to AFS. In response to rising consumer
demand, AFS vendors formed trade associations to defend the
industry, market their financial products, and develop model
business practices. The second installment proposes AFS as reflective of a secondary financial services market that complements the secondary labor market, explores the controversy
around “predatory lending” as well as regulatory strategies,
and details the rapid innovation of financial products designed
for the working poor. Community-based financial services are
proposed as a strategy to provide constructive financial products to low-income families.
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